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ABSTRACT 
 
A number of studies have shown that defence contractors have exhibited a marked 
reluctance to diversify away from defence and develop civil applications. However 
the aero engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce is one defence contractor to whom this 
does not apply. Over a sixty year period it has moved from being almost entirely 
dependent on defence work, to a point where defence now constitutes barely one fifth 
of its turnover.  This paper examines the development of the company’s civil 
aerospace business over the period since 1945. The paper focuses specifically on the 
strategies used by Rolls-Royce in the civil aerospace field. These strategies are 
explored in the context of changes in market conditions, technology, and governance 
arrangements. The effectiveness of the various strategies, including their contribution 
to the company’s current position, is evaluated.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite an industrial policy in the 1960s that explicitly sought civil applications for 
military technologies1, and reductions in the UK’s defence commitments over many 
years that led to a decline in defence expenditure as a proportion of GNP2, some 
defence contractors appear to have shown little interest in developing civil work, 
preferring instead to focus on their core business. 
 
One leading UK defence contractor has run counter to this trend, namely the aero 
engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce. In the immediate post-war period Rolls-Royce was 
predominantly a manufacturer of military engines3. Despite setbacks and some 
significant reverses, the civil side of its business has grown to the point where military 
aerospace now constitutes a little over one fifth of its total turnover4. This paper sets 
out to explore how Rolls-Royce developed from an overwhelming dependence on 
defence work to the point where today defence is only a comparatively modest part of 
the enterprise. 
 
 
DEFENCE DEPENDENCY 
 
Examples of defence contractors that conform to a pattern of defence dependency 
include the helicopter manufacturer Westland, the submarine builder VSEL, airframe 
manufacturer British Aerospace and electronics manufacturer Ferranti. Westland 
moved into the helicopter field in the years after World War Two.  Although it 
established itself as the leading UK helicopter manufacturer by producing versions of 
American Sikorsky helicopters built under licence, between 1945 and 1960 a mere 5.4 
per cent of the company’s output for the home market went to the civil sector5. As the 
North Sea oil and gas exploration market emerged in the 1960s, Westland failed to 
grasp the opportunity, despite a one-off success in selling its Wessex helicopter to 
Bristow Helicopters, a civil operator run by an ex-Westland employee6. In the 1970s, 
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though its Sea King helicopter was well suited to the needs of this market, Westland 
failed to adapt it to the needs of North Sea operations. Westland’s American rival, 
Sikorsky, showed no such misgivings and by the 1980s dominated the market with its 
S61 helicopter. Belatedly Westland developed the W30, adapted from its military 
Lynx design, but it proved too little too late. Lacking the range and capacity required 
for the North Sea, the project was written off in 1985 at a cost of £100m7. 
 
If Westland provides an example of a defence contractor that failed to recognise the 
opportunities presented by the growth of commercial aviation, the shipbuilder VSEL 
provides an example of a defence contractor with substantial civil manufacturing 
interests that it neglected and ultimately disposed of, on the pretext that it wanted to 
focus on its core business8. In the 1960s Vickers Shipbuilders Group at Barrow, as 
VSEL was formerly known, comprised both shipbuilding and general engineering 
interests. Although most of the shipbuilding work was defence related, the 
engineering division was more diverse and included a substantial amount of civil 
work that comprised cement machinery, power generation and mining equipment9. 
After the firm closed its cement machinery business in 1970, civil work generally 
became marginalised, as the company increasingly focussed on marine work. The 
onset of the Trident submarine programme in the late 1980s and early 1990s merely 
continued this trend, although the sheer scale of Trident meant that other work got 
squeezed out. Ultimately by the 1990s VSEL had become one of the most defence 
dependent prime contractors in the world, with more than 95 per cent military 
production10. Mort and Spinardi11 suggest that VSEL was ‘far from atypical of post 
World War Two industrial behaviour in the UK’, indeed they go so far as to suggest 
that there is widespread evidence of British manufacturing companies favouring 
defence work over civil.  
 
Less dramatic but none the less significant cases of other firms that favoured defence 
work over civil include British Aerospace and Ferranti.  Gummett12 notes that by 
1990, after several years of trying to diversify away from the defence sector, British 
Aerospace’s turnover from sales of military aircraft and other defence systems was 
three times that from civil aircraft. Similarly at Ferranti, despite a big investment in 
domestic electronics and civil computing, the company withdrew from both fields in 
the 1960s as it increasingly focussed on defence avionics13. 
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 EARLY SUCCESS IN CIVIL AVIATION 
 
In the immediate postwar years civil aviation was dominated by American 
manufacturers. This reflected the continued development of large four-engined 
airliners in the US in the early 1940s14, at a time when the development of comparable 
designs in Britain had been halted by the British government. The leading American 
airliners of this period were the Lockheed Constellation which first flew in 1943 and 
the Douglas DC6 which first flew in 1946. They were followed in the early 1950s by 
improved versions in the form of the Super Constellation, the ‘first of the true 
intercontinental airliners’15, and the DC7. US dominance in the airliner market was 
replicated in the civil aero engine market, where Pratt and Whitney and Wright were 
the leading manufacturers. All the larger American airliners of the 1940s and 1950s 
were powered by American produced piston engines, principally Pratt and Whitney’s 
R2800 and Wright’s R-335016 
 
In Britain, Bristol, the leading producer of civil engines pre-war17, retained its 
position in the early postwar years. Its Centaurus and Hercules engines powered most 
of the British airliners of the immediate postwar period. Though its wartime Merlin 
engine was poorly suited to the demands of the civil market18, in the late 1940s 
Denning Pearson, then general manager responsible for sales and service, persuaded 
Rolls-Royce’s managing director, Ernest Hives that the company should seek to 
‘major in civil aviation’19. Rolls-Royce’s first gas turbine engine for this market was 
the turboprop Dart, which entered service as the world’s first commercial gas turbine 
on 18th April 195320. The design brief called for an engine that drew upon the 
company’s previous experience and practice. Hence the Dart was a relatively simple 
design using a centrifugal compressor that built on Rolls-Royce’s wartime experience 
with superchargers21, rather than utilizing the more advanced axial compressor then 
under development, and it enabled the company to enter the market some four or five 
years ahead of rival turboprop and turbojet designs and avoid many of the technical 
problems encountered by competitors.  
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Table 1 
Dart Engine Civil Applications 
 
 Application Engines Country
of origin 
Entry into 
service 
Quantity 
1. Vickers Viscount 4 UK 1953 444 
2. Fokker F27 2 Holland 1958 750 
3. Handley Page Herald 2 UK 1961 50 
4. Armstrong-Whitworth Argosy 4 UK 1959 76 
5. Grumman Gulfstream 1 2 US 1959 200 
6. Avro 748 2 UK 1962 400 
7. NAMC YS-11 2 Japan 1965 182 
8. Convair CV 600 2 US 1965 67 
 Total    2169 
Source: Heathcote, Roy. The Rolls-Royce Dart – pioneering turboprop, Historical 
Series No. 18, Derby: The Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust. 1992. 
 
Powering small/medium range airliners such as the British built Vickers Viscount, the 
Dart was an outstanding success. The Dart-powered Vickers Viscount sold 
particularly well in North America22. Trans Canada Airlines was one of the first 
airlines to order the Viscount in 1952, eventually taking some 51 aircraft. Having 
broken into the North American market, orders from the US duly followed, most 
notably from Capital Airlines who eventually purchased 6023. The success of the first 
commercial application of the Dart on the Vickers Viscount not only demonstrated the 
suitability of gas turbines for commercial airline service, it also encouraged other 
applications (table 1) including the Dart-powered Fokker F27 which became the 
world’s best selling turboprop airliner24. The Dart outsold all other commercial 
turboprop engines. It was Rolls-Royce’s best selling commercial engine of the 1950s 
and 1960s (table 2) with more than 5000 engines delivered over the period 1952-66 
and total sales of £155.7m25, of which 75.5 per cent were exports26. 
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Table 2 
Sales of Rolls-Royce Commercial Engines 1952-66 
 Dart RA29 
(Avon) 
Conway Tyne Spey 
 £m £m £m £m £m 
Home Sales 38.2 24.4 51.3 15.3 26.6
N. America 44.3 4.2 24.7 31.7 18.5
Other 73.2 69.3 22.9 8.5 13.8
Export Sales 117.5 73.5 47.6 40.2 32.3
Total 155.7 97.9 98.9 55.5 58.9
 
Source: Churchill/PRSN 1/29 Report on the commercial business generated by the 
Dart, Avon, Conway, Tyne and Spey aero engines 1952-66, January 1967, p4. 
 
The success of the Dart in terms of sales to foreign airlines, especially in North 
America, enabled Rolls-Royce to learn the civil aviation business. In the civil aviation 
field, as General Electric discovered when it entered the civil market in the 1960s, the 
airlines had much more demanding requirements in terms of product support and 
spare parts availability27. The US was both the largest civil aviation market and the 
most developed, hence selling gas turbine engines in North America meant that Rolls-
Royce gained first hand experience of the levels of service and support expected in 
the US. As Gardner28 notes, the Viscount airliner gave Rolls-Royce experience of 
several million flying hours as well as:  
 
the hard-won knowledge of what operators – especially in the USA – required 
and expected  from a major-league supplier in the way of service support, 
spares and guarantees. 
 
When the leading airlines switched to turbojet powered airliners in the early 1960s it 
led to a period of volatility in the civil aero engine market. Of the two leading 
manufacturers of piston engines, Pratt and Whitney and Wright, the former affected a 
smooth transition to turbojet engines by offering the JT3 engine, a modified version of 
its successful J57 military engine. Wright retained a strong commitment to piston 
engine technology during the 1950s. Turbo-compound versions of its R-3350 engine 
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represented the ‘pinnacle’ of piston engine technology29. Wright flirted briefly with 
the new gas turbine technology, producing a licence-built version of the British 
Armstrong-Siddeley Sapphire turbojet engine30, but it proved to be too little too late 
and the engine met with little commercial success leading to Wright’s rapid exit from 
the industry by the mid-1960s. 
 
As Wright left the commercial aero engine sector so General Electric of the US 
entered. Having established a strong position in the military engine market, General 
Electric offered a commercial version of its J79 military turbojet engine, the CJ805. 
Unfortunately the principal application for this engine, the Convair 880/990 arrived 
on the market after its main competitors, the Boeing 707 and the Douglas DC8, and 
only sold in small numbers. As a result General Electric gained only a small share of 
the commercial jet market during the 1960s31. Rolls-Royce fared better when it came 
to launch a civil turbojet engine. Like its American rivals Rolls-Royce initially relied 
on a turbojet engine designed and developed for the military market. The RA29 or 
Avon engine as it was also known, was Rolls-Royce’s first axial turbojet and it found 
a number of civil applications including later versions of the British Comet and the 
French Caravelle short range airliner. The Caravelle, introduced in 1958, was the first 
short range jet airliner. Used extensively by the French national carrier, Air France, it 
also sold well in the US32. Rolls-Royce continued to expand its production of civil 
engines in the 1960s, helped by Britain’s initial lead in the jet airliner field that saw 
the introduction of a number of British designs, such as the Hawker-Siddeley Trident 
and the BAC 1-11, both powered by Rolls-Royce’s Spey turbofan. While the first of 
these designs, the Hawker-Siddeley Trident, only sold in small numbers, the BAC 1-
11 did rather better, with extensive sales to foreign airlines including Braniff, 
Mohawk and American Airlines in the US. Nor was the Spey engine, confined to 
British airframes. The Dutch manufacturer, Fokker, installed Spey engines on its short 
range regional airliner, the F28, as did US manufacturer Grumman for its Gulfstream 
II and III business jets.  
 
Combined sales of the turboprop Dart and the Avon and Spey jet engines helped to 
give Rolls-Royce a 31 per cent share of the worldwide civil gas turbine market33 
between 1956 and 1964. In the words of chief executive Sir Denning Pearson, Rolls-
Royce’s strategy focussed on establishing the company as, 
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…a supplier of engines for the smaller and medium sized airline and executive 
aircraft34 
 
Focussing on this market segment proved highly effective in gaining entry to the 
market for commercial aero engines and positioning Rolls-Royce alongside Pratt and 
Whitney and General Electric, as one of a small number of manufacturers of both 
military and civil gas turbine engines. It also avoided direct head-to-head competition 
with rivals Pratt and Whitney and General Electric who supplied the leading US 
airliner manufacturers and was a way around the institutional barrier of single 
sourcing, where airframe manufacturers specified a single make of engine35. With 
American airframe manufacturers like Boeing closely linked to American engine 
makers like Pratt and Whitney, this made the prospect of market entry particularly 
difficult for European engine manufacturers like Rolls-Royce. 
 
Having gained a slice of the emerging market for civil gas turbines, Rolls-Royce 
became part of a well defined strategic group. The Big Three, comprising Rolls-
Royce, Pratt and Whitney and General Electric, were the only aero engine 
manufacturers with the capability to design, develop, manufacture and support both 
military and civil aero engines36. Other strategic groups served the various national 
military markets, but only the Big Three engine makers had a presence in both the 
military and civil segments and competed on an international basis.  
 
 
AMERICAN STRATEGY 
 
Although the introduction of its 707 airliner quickly established Boeing as a 
manufacturer of commercial jet airliners, it was the arrival of further Boeing designs 
in the mid-1960s, especially the medium range tri-jet 727 and the twin-jet 73737, that 
‘firmly established Boeing’s position in the market’38, dis-lodging Douglas, the 
former market leader. Boeing’s market dominance had significant implications since 
the company maintained a particularly close relationship with the US engine maker 
Pratt and Whitney. Hence as the civil aviation market came to be dominated by 
Boeing during the course of the 1960s, so the civil aero engine market came to be 
dominated by Pratt and Whitney. Bluestone et al.39 estimate that between 1966 and 
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1978 Pratt and Whitney accounted for almost three quarters of all civil aero engine 
orders.  
 
The implications of Boeing’s success in the market for the first generation of 
commercial jet airliners, and the resulting market dominance of Pratt and Whitney, 
were well appreciated at Rolls-Royce’s Derby headquarters. Market analysis 
presented to a committee of Rolls-Royce’s main board on 27th February 1967 showed 
that sales of the five existing civil engines then in production, would fall dramatically 
from £58.9 million in 1969 to £3.5 million in 197540. This massive decline was the 
result of poor sales prospects for many of the company’s existing commercial aero 
engines. It was anticipated that only the Spey engine41 would continue selling well 
into the 1970s and its prospects were limited because of the weak demand for Rolls-
Royce powered British airliners in a market increasingly dominated by Boeing.  
Faced with a predicted sharp decline in its share of the civil market, Rolls-Royce 
might well have chosen to take the path followed by many defence contractors in the 
UK, and simply opted out of the civil market. But it did not.  
 
Instead Rolls-Royce retained its commitment to civil aviation. Following its takeover 
of its only UK rival, Bristol Siddeley Engines Ltd (BSEL) two years earlier, in 1968 
Rolls-Royce designated its Bristol site as the ‘prime site’ for military engine work 
within the company42, a move that reflected BSEL’s close relationship with the RAF. 
At the same time Derby, was designated the centre for civil engine work. This move 
not only marked the increasing divergence between military and civil engine 
technology, it also demonstrated Rolls-Royce’s commitment to civil aviation. It was 
no coincidence that henceforth civil engine manufacture was to be based at the 
company’s headquarters at Derby.  
 
However if Rolls-Royce was to maintain its position in the civil market, the 
company’s senior management was clear that it had to obtain ‘a permanent foothold 
in the US market’43, because by the late 1960s US aircraft manufacturers dominated 
the market for commercial airliners. As Rolls-Royce’s chief executive Sir Denning 
Pearson44 explained, 
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It appeared to us that if we were to stay in the civil engine business which we 
had built up since the war, we needed to get into a United States – built 
airframe as first engine choice. 
 
An opportunity to break into the US market began to appear in the late 1960s as the 
aircraft manufacturers started to plan for a new generation of wide-bodied airliners 
powered by new high by-pass ratio (HBPR) engines. Both Pratt and Whitney and 
General Electric received extensive US government funding to design and build 
demonstrator versions of HBPR engines, as part of the giant C5A military transport 
programme of the late1960s45. Denied such support, Rolls-Royce sought a strategic 
alliance with General Motors46 and its Allison engine division for joint development 
and production of an HBPR engine for this new market, in order to share the 
anticipated heavy development cost and make it more attractive to the US market. 
However despite lengthy negotiations this cooperative venture never materialised. 
 
Rolls-Royce lost out in the competition for engines to power the first wide-bodied jet, 
the Boeing 747, when Pratt and Whitney’s JT9D design was selected in 1966. 
However by 1967 there were three further wide-bodied airliners being proposed, from 
Lockheed and McDonnell-Douglas in the US and the new European Airbus 
consortium. The Americans were proposing tri-jet designs while the Europeans had 
come up with a proposal for a twin jet. For these wide-bodied applications Rolls-
Royce’s proposed ‘advanced technology engine’47 was to be available in two sizes, 
the RB207, an engine of  50,000lbs thrust and a smaller 30,000lbs thrust engine 
designated the RB211. Within the company there was a preference for the smaller 
engine because it avoided direct competition with Pratt and Whitney’s JT9D48.  
 
The advanced technology engine employed a very ambitious design that was more 
technologically advanced than either of the engines being developed by its US rivals. 
It was potentially quieter, more fuel efficient and more reliable. This was possible by 
virtue of the novel three shaft architecture employed on the advanced technology 
engine. The three shaft architecture made for a significantly shorter engine which 
made it more rigid and thence more reliable49. Potentially it also made the engine 
heavier, but Rolls-Royce planned to use a revolutionary wide chord fan50 made from 
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carbon fibre that was both lighter and more aerodynamically efficient than the solid 
titanium blades used by its rivals, resulting in a quieter and more fuel efficient engine.  
 
After a long sales campaign the RB211 engine was selected by Lockheed in March 
1968 for its L-1011 TriStar wide-bodied airliner.  It is hard to over-estimate the 
significance of the Lockheed contract for the company at this time. Indeed as a later 
enquiry51 noted: 
 
a contract with a US manufacturer had for them become not merely a 
consummation devoutly to be wished, but a task in which failure would be 
unthinkable. 
 
Though the larger RB207 was also selected for the European Airbus, when Rolls-
Royce found it simply did not have the resources to develop two new engines 
simultaneously, the American strategy came to the fore and this engine programme 
was terminated, leaving this particular market segment to General Electric. In the 
event a combination of financial and contractual difficulties on the RB211 engine, 
combined with a failure on the part of Rolls-Royce’s management to appreciate and 
provide for the technical problems involved in developing an advanced design, led to 
the company being taken into public ownership in February 1971, ironically on the 
very day that the RB211 engine delivered its designed performance under test. 
Eventually a new contract with Lockheed was negotiated and thanks to favourable 
exchange rates, the first batch of RB211 engines was delivered at a profit52.  
 
Although the RB211 achieved both technical and financial success (table 3), and 
helped to maintain Rolls-Royce’s position as a major player in the civil market, the 
company’s new management quickly realised that in the civil aero engine market, 
Rolls-Royce still had a limited customer base. Plans to extend the customer base 
remained firmly wedded to the company’s American strategy. In this Rolls-Royce 
was helped by changes in the institutional arrangements surrounding the airliner 
market. The competitive scramble that surrounded the launch of the first wide-bodied 
jets led to moves away from single sourcing of engines in favour of multiple 
sourcing53.  
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Table 3 
Sales of HBPR engines by the Big Three manufacturers 1972-1982 
 
Engine 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
JT9D 147 164 108 144 102 42 91 215 249 158 130 
CF6 212 162 209 113 119 124 182 297 336 228 150 
RB211 114 163 135 111 39 55 71 74 151 195 128 
Source: Rogers, M. Foster. “Global competition in the aero engine industry”, Paper 
presented at the Prince Bertil Symposium, 7-9 November, Stockholm, Sweden. 1984. 
 
Ironically it was Pratt and Whitney, the company that benefited most from single 
sourcing in the 1960s that started the trend towards multiple sourcing, when their 
JT9D engine was selected by North West Airlines and Japan Airlines for the long 
range version of the McDonnell-Douglas DC10 which had hitherto been powered 
exclusively by General Electric’s military derived CF6 engine. However it was in the 
747 market that multiple sourcing really took off. Boeing was attracted to the idea of 
competition from engine companies as a way of broadening the customer base for the 
747,  and specified the General Electric CF6 engine as an alternative to Pratt and 
Whitney’ s  JT9D. CF6 powered 747s became particularly strong in the European 
market helped by the involvement of France’s Snecma and Germany’s MTU as 
minority partners in this engine programme, and marking a resurgence of General 
Electric in the civil engine market.  
 
These new institutional arrangements provided scope for Rolls-Royce too to broaden 
its customer base. In 1972 work began on an up-rated and optimised version of the 
RB211. Formerly launched in 1974 as a 50,000lbs thrust engine for the long range 
version of the Lockheed L1011, the 524 engine used the same sized fan as the RB211 
but with a re-designed core54. However the 524 was powerful enough to power the 
747 and in 1975 Boeing began offering the 524 as an engine option. The 524 had the 
advantage of being more fuel efficient than either of its US-made rivals and in the 
following year Rolls-Royce made a major breakthrough when British Airways 
ordered six 524 powered 747-200s55. Entering service in 1977, the 524 did 
particularly well in the rapidly growing Asian market where Cathay Pacific, Qantas, 
All Nippon Airways and Air New Zealand ordered 747s powered by Rolls-Royce’s 
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524 engine56.  As a result the company’s share of the HBPR engine market, which as 
table 3 shows had dipped in the second half of the 1970s following the initial success 
of the RB211, rose steadily in the early 1980s. By 1981 Rolls-Royce had a 31 per cent 
share of the HBPR market, outselling Pratt and Whitney’s JT9D in that year.  
 
In the late 1970s Rolls-Royce took its American strategy a step further when it put 
forward a new engine for Boeing’s proposed 757 twin-jet, then being developed as a 
replacement for the best selling 727. Described as a ‘cropped fan’ design, the new 
engine comprised the core of the RB211 but with the fan scaled down from 85.5 
inches to 73.2 inches, giving a power rating of 37,000lbs57. In 1978 the new engine 
was designated the launch engine on the Boeing 757, the first time that Boeing had 
ever launched a new airliner with anything other than a Pratt and Whitney engine. 
Rolls-Royce’s 12.7 per cent market share at this time was well behind both Pratt and 
Whitney with a massive 62.7 per cent and General Electric with 24.6 per cent58, the 
latter having recovered from the very poor performance of its first commercial 
turbojet engine the CJ805, through the success of its military-derived CF6 engine that 
powered the McDonnell-Douglas DC10 and the Airbus A300. Though in third place 
behind its US rivals, nonetheless Rolls-Royce’s market share at this time was 
considerably healthier than earlier in the decade and, as a vindication of the American 
strategy, its engines now powered three different American airliners.  
 
 
FULL LINE STRATEGY 
 
The 535 engine entered service in 1982, but within months, the impact of a second oil 
crisis on fuel prices and severe financial problems for US airlines caused by 
competition following the de-regulation of the airline industry, brought a sharp drop 
in the demand for airliners, especially the new Boeing 75759.  Worse still was 
Lockheed’s decision in 1982 to exit the civil airliner market by ceasing production of 
its L-1011 Tri-Star airliner60, when outstanding orders had been completed in 1984. 
These events exposed shortcomings in Rolls-Royce’s product strategy, particularly its 
relentless pursuit of the US market. 
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Hence the early 1980s proved a testing time for Rolls-Royce. Having made a small 
loss in 1981, profitability declined sharply in 1982, as the company recorded a loss of 
£91m61. This reflected, ‘a sharp reduction in workload in 1982’. The following year 
things were worse. Rolls-Royce’s new chairman, Sir William Duncan, noted62: 
 
It is obvious we are still emerging from the worst recession in airline history, 
and that 1983 was another very difficult year throughout the aerospace 
business, including Rolls-Royce. 
 
Sales of large commercial engines by Rolls-Royce fell from 150 in 1982 to a mere 60 
in 1983. The situation in terms of new orders was even worse with orders for large 
commercial engines totalling a mere 30. This was at a point where Rolls-Royce had 
geared up to manufacture 300 large commercial engines per year. Not until the 
following year did Rolls-Royce see any sign of improvement when the second half of 
the year brought a steady growth of workload for the civil business63.  
 
The sharp decline in orders in the early 1980s forced Rolls-Royce’s senior 
management into a change of strategy. Despite its success in developing derivatives 
of the RB211, even by the mid-1980s Rolls-Royce had a total of only five civil 
airframe applications64, four of which were American. By comparison Rolls-Royce’s 
US rivals Pratt and Whitney and General Electric offered ten and nine applications 
respectively65. It was now apparent that in pursuing its American strategy Rolls-
Royce had failed to foresee the success of Airbus66. While Lockheed and McDonnell-
Douglas had engaged in a fierce struggle with their near identical three-engine 
designs, Airbus had entered the market in the mid-1970s with a twin-engine wide-
bodied design. Although sales had been slow at first, the increasing reliability of gas 
turbine engines combined with a second oil crisis in the early 1980s, demonstrated the 
superiority of twin-engine designs in the wide-bodied sector. Airbus’s share of new 
orders for commercial airliners which in 1975 stood at 8 per cent rose to 31 per cent 
in 199067 achieved largely at the expense of McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed. 
Rolls-Royce’s pre-occupation with its American strategy allowed the US engine 
manufacturer General Electric to build a near monopoly of Airbus applications.  
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Consequently from the mid-1980s onwards Rolls-Royce attempted to re-position 
itself within the global aero engine market. To get on equal terms with its US rivals 
and raise its overall share of the civil aero engine market, it adopted a ‘full line’68 or 
‘generalist’69 strategy designed to broaden its product portfolio. The logic behind this 
full line strategy was that having more airframe applications would lead to more sales 
and thence a higher market share. Offering a product portfolio comprising engines for 
all segments of the market also provided scope for extending the application of gas 
turbine technology, thereby spreading the very high R & D cost associated with 
maintaining the technology base, across the maximum number of engines. For Rolls-
Royce this was particularly attractive since unlike its two US rivals, it was not part of 
a large diversified industrial conglomerate and therefore its access to resources was 
more limited.  
 
In order to implement the full line strategy Rolls-Royce resorted to a series of 
strategic alliances with other engine manufacturers, including a number of smaller 
manufacturers of military engines with ambitions for involvement in the civil engine 
market. In a seven year period between 1983 and 1990, Rolls-Royce concluded no 
fewer than four collaborative agreements for new civil engines (table 4). The first of 
these was a joint venture with Pratt and Whitney to develop a new engine of 
25,000lbs thrust. The joint venture company was called International Aero Engines 
AG (IAE) and was established in December 1983.  The initiative behind the formation 
of IAE was to satisfy the growing demand for new, fuel efficient, environmentally-
friendly, easy to maintain turbofan engines in the 10 tonne class. Such engines were 
needed to power a new generation of narrow-bodied airliners like the Airbus A320. 
 
IAE effectively brought together two design teams. One, comprising Rolls-Royce and 
a Japanese group, Japan Aero Engine Company (JAEC) were developing a slightly 
smaller engine the RJ50070. The other comprised Pratt and Whitney and minority 
European partners MTU of Germany and Fiat of Italy who had previously 
collaborated on the PW2037 engine.   
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Table 4 
Civil Joint Ventures involving Rolls-Royce 
 
Joint  
Venture 
Company 
International Aero 
Engines AG 
General Electric 
Rolls-Royce 
Williams Rolls 
Inc 
BMW Rolls-
Royce GmbH 
Type Joint venture Risk &Revenue 
Sharing 
Partnership 
Joint venture Joint venture 
Partners Rolls-Royce (30%) 
Pratt & Whitney (30%) 
MTU (12.1%) 
Fiat (8%) 
JAE (19.9%) 
General Electric 
(85%/75%) 
Rolls-Royce 
(15%/25% 
Rolls-Royce 
(15%) 
Williams 
International 
(85%) 
Rolls-Royce 
(49.9%) 
BMW (51.1%) 
Product 
 
 
V25000 CF6-80C 
535-E4 
FJ44 BR700 
Date  1983 1984 1989 1990 
Thrust 
(lbs) 
25,000-33,000 lb. 40,000lbs & 
60,000lbs 
2,300 lb. 15,000-21,000 
lb. 
Airframe A320, A321, MD90 A310 & B757 Cessna Citation, 
SJ30, Raytheon 
Premier 1 
Gulfstream V, 
Global Express, 
Boeing 717 
Market Small Commercial 
Airliners 
Large & medium 
twin jet airliners 
Small Business 
Jets 
Large Business 
Jets, Regional 
Jets 
 
For Rolls-Royce, IAE and the V2500 engine filled a gap in its product portfolio 
between the largest version of its Tay engine of 18,000lbs thrust and the smallest 
engine in the RB211 family the 535 engine developing 37,000lbs thrust. This was a 
sector in which General Electric had begun to enjoy success with its military derived 
CFM56 engine, which was the product of a joint venture with the French engine 
maker Snecma. Despite initial technical problems with the V2500,  IAE firmly 
established itself within its market sector. The V2500 went into service in 1989 and 
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during the course of the 1990s output rose steadily so that by 1998 IAE’s output was 
running at 300 engines per year71. By 2002 IAE had achieved a 70 per cent share of 
the Airbus A320 market72. With the V2500 powering the A319, A320 and A321 
versions of the narrow-bodied Airbus as well as the McDonnell-Douglas MD 80 and 
MD90, the joint venture enabled Rolls-Royce to significantly increase the number of 
its civil airframe applications. 
 
Rolls-Royce’s second  collaborative venture during the 1980s was formed in February 
1984 when the company concluded an agreement with General Electric whereby it 
would take a 15 per cent stake in the latter’s CF6-80 engine programme in return for 
General Electric taking a similar stake in Rolls-Royce’s 535E4 programme (table 4). 
The arrangement with General Electric was not a joint venture but a risk and revenue 
sharing partnership where each partner simply took a stake in one of the other 
partners’ engine programmes. The agreement gave Rolls-Royce access to the market 
for very large engines of 60,000lbs thrust being developed for the second generation 
of wide-bodied jets such as the Airbus A310, while giving General Electric access to 
the market for second generation narrow-bodied jets such as the Boeing 757. The 
agreement was widely welcomed in the British press. Sir William Duncan, Rolls-
Royce’s new chairman, portrayed the agreement with General Electric as another 
move in the company’s strategy of broadening its product portfolio. In the company’s 
annual report73 he noted: 
 
As a result of these two new collaborative ventures, Rolls-Royce will be 
competing in all the main sectors of the gas turbine market for commercial 
aero engines. 
 
He went on to stress that it was financial pressures at this time which had forced the 
company to resort to collaborating, noting that collaboration had the effect of: 
 
….reducing the heavy financial burden associated with the launch of new 
engine projects. 
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He reiterated Rolls-Royce’s strategy particularly in relation to the company’s use of a 
full line strategy to maintain its technology base in evidence to the Trade and Industry 
Committee of the House of Commons in June 198474 
 
If we had not sought to collaborate with Pratt and Whitney in the V2500, and 
General Electric in the large thrust CF6-80C, one could not have seen us being 
able to sustain our previous level of research and development. 
 
However there were those who placed a different interpretation on Rolls-Royce’s 
agreement with General Electric. Rogers75 in an analysis of the aero engine market at 
this time pointed out that collaboration with General Electric meant that the company 
was abandoning any hopes it might have of competing in the market for ultra high 
power engines of 60,000lbs thrust or more. Since Rolls-Royce’s role in the CF6-80C 
engine was at best a minor one, the company was effectively leaving this market 
sector to its arch rivals, Pratt and Whitney and General Electric. The sector involved 
the most sophisticated engines employing the most advanced technology, so Rolls-
Royce was effectively ceding technological leadership to its rivals.  
 
However on 5th November 1984, Sir William Duncan, the architect of the General 
Electric agreement, died suddenly76. His successor as chairman, Sir Francis Tombs, 
was less enthusiastic about this particular collaborative agreement. During 1985 it 
became clear that an upgraded and more powerful version of Rolls-Royce’s own 524 
engine could be developed as a competitor to the CF6-80C for long range versions of 
Boeing’s new 767 airliner as well as McDonnell-Douglas’s proposed MD11. This, 
combined with an upturn in the civil engine market and a rapid improvement in Rolls-
Royce’s profitability led to the agreement with General Electric being terminated in 
November 198677.  
 
The two further collaborative ventures that Rolls-Royce entered at this time fared 
rather better. In 1989, Rolls-Royce embarked on a joint venture with Williams 
International Inc. of the US, a manufacturer of small gas turbine engines. Williams 
International had developed a range of small gas turbines to power cruise missiles in 
the 1970s and by the 1980s was keen to use the expertise it had built up to enter the 
market for engines to power small business jets. The joint venture brought together 
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Rolls-Royce’s expertise in manufacturing components such as turbine discs and 
turbine blades and its worldwide product support capability with Williams 
International’s expertise and experience in small gas turbines. The main application 
for the 1,900lbs thrust FJ44 engine proved to be Cessna’s best selling CitationJet, and 
by 1999 the Williams-Rolls joint venture had produced more than 1,000 engines. In 
terms of Rolls-Royce’s full line strategy, the Williams-Rolls joint venture enabled the 
company to extend its product range in the small engine sector of the market.  
 
The other joint venture was an Anglo-German collaboration with car manufacturer 
BMW, established in May 1990 to develop a new engine in the 15,000-20,000lbs 
thrust market sector to power  a new generation of regional airliners and large ‘heavy 
iron’ business jets, as well as re-engining old aircraft78. For BMW the joint venture 
represented a return to aero engine manufacturing after a gap of almost 30 years, the 
company having been one of the pioneers of the jet engine during World War II. Sir 
Ralph Robins made clear Rolls-Royce’s perspective in evidence to the House of 
Commons Trade and Industry Committee in 199379 when he noted that Rolls-Royce: 
 
had no money left to do another engine, but we knew that we had the 
capability of penetrating that market because it is a market in which we have 
been very successful in the past. 
 
The joint venture developed the BR700 engine which came in two versions the 
BR710 for large business jets and the BR715 for regional airliners. Entering service in 
1996, by 1999 the joint venture’s order book had risen to 1,000 engines with turnover 
in that year amounting to £727m.  
 
In volume terms, this joint venture, along with Rolls-Royce’s other cooperative 
ventures of the 1980s, IAE and Williams-Rolls Inc, played a major part in increasing 
the aero engine manufacturer’s penetration of the civil aero engine market. This is 
reflected in table 5 which shows the pattern of Rolls-Royce’s engine deliveries, in 
particular the sharp rise in deliveries of civil engines relative to military engines from 
the mid 1990s onwards. 
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Table 5  
Rolls-Royce Engine Deliveries 1994-2001 
 
Year Military Civil  Total 
1995 120 405 525 
1996 214 424 638 
1997 161 625 786 
1998 164 911 1,075 
1999 181 1,080 1,261 
2000 194 1,091 1,285 
2001 179 1,362 1,541 
Source: Rolls-Royce. Annual Report 1999, London: Rolls-Royce plc. 2000;  Rolls-
Royce. Annual Report 2001, London: Rolls-Royce plc. 2002. 
 
While Rolls-Royce was forced to rely on collaborative agreements to extend its 
product portfolio in the 1980s, in the 1990s it relied on a unique modular design of 
engine to extend its product portfolio at the top end of the power range. By the mid-
1980s the G and H versions of Rolls-Royce’s 524 engine were delivering 60,000lbs 
thrust80, but as the airliner manufacturers began to develop proposals for a second 
generation of wide-bodied airliners, it became clear that engines more powerful than 
Rolls-Royce’s largest version of the 524 would be needed. Among the proposed 
airliners coming forward were the McDonnell-Douglas MD11, the Airbus A330/340 
and the Boeing 767-X. To meet the requirements of these new airliners Rolls-Royce 
proposed an up-rated version of the 524, the 524L, but it quickly became apparent that 
this new market niche would in time stretch well beyond even this thrust level. In the 
face of growing requirements for greater power outputs the reaction of Rolls-Royce’s 
competitors varied. General Electric opted for an entirely new design, the GE90, 
while Pratt and Whitney went for a more powerful derivative of its current large 
engine the PW4000. Rolls-Royce revised its proposed 524 engine and judging the 
revised engine to be a step change made this clear by designating the new engine as 
the Trent when it was launched in 1988, in order to signify that although it was a three 
shaft modular design incorporating a number of features of the 524, it was in fact a 
new engine. As such it was designed to form the basis of a family of new engines.  
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By 1990 the family included three engines all based on a common Trent core. By 
fitting a different size of fan to a common core, Rolls-Royce was able to offer three 
different sizes of engine each with a different power output and targeted at a different 
airframe application. As table 6 shows the Trent 600 with a 95 inch fan and 65,000-
68,000lbs thrust would power the MD11, the Trent 700 with a 97.5 inch fan and 
67,000-71,000lbs thrust would power the A330 while the Trent 800 with a 110 inch 
fan would power the 767-X.  
 
Table 6  
The Trent Engine programme 
 
Engine Trent 
500 
Trent  
600 
Trent 
700 
Trent 
800 
Trent 
900 
Trent 
1000 
Thrust lbs 53,000-
56,000 
65,000-
68,000 
67,000-
71,000 
92,000-
95,000 
80,000 58,000-
70,000 
Fan size 97.5in. 95in. 97.5in 110in. 116in. 112in. 
Bypass ratio 8.5:1 8:1 5.5:1 6.5:1 8:1 10:1 
Entry into service 2002 With-
drawn 
1995 1996 2006 2008 
Application A340 MD11 A330 B777 A380 B787 
Source: Walters, Brian. “Rolls’ biggest fan”, Air International, 56, No.2 (1999): 115-
118; Wastnage, Justin. “Airbus briefs suppliers on A350”, Flight International, 28 
September – 4 October, (2004): 6. 
 
 
Rolls-Royce was able to meet the different power requirements of these aircraft by 
virtue of the Trent’s modular three shaft design configuration. This had been a feature 
of the initial proposal for the RB211 put forward by Rolls-Royce’s designer Adrian 
Lombard in the 1960s81. The use of three shafts gave the designers much greater 
scope for varying performance characteristics of the engine. In particular it facilitated 
the use of a common core82 with the power output varied by the size of fan used. The 
use of the same basic design for the core meant that Rolls-Royce could develop new 
engines more quickly and more cheaply83.  
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As a design principle, modularity was not new. In the 1980s Rolls-Royce’s ‘cropped 
fan’ engine, the 535, had used the same principle by fitting a smaller fan to create a 
de-rated version of the RB211. However the core was not designed at the outset for 
up-rating or de-rating. The Trent engine programme from the outset used modularity, 
something that Rolls-Royce’s unique three shaft layout directly facilitated. As table 6 
shows by 2002 the Trent had evolved into five different engines84 ranging in size from 
53,000lbs to 95,000lbs thrust, achieved in large part by fitting a different size of fan to 
a common core. 
 
The first two Trent engines were developed in the early 1990s. The Trent 700 which 
entered service in 1995 with Cathay Pacific, was a particularly significant 
development as it was Rolls-Royce’s first Airbus application using an engine not built 
by a joint venture. The Trent 800 which entered service a year later in 1996 found a 
market on Boeing’s 777, as the 767-X was ultimately designated, and by 1999 had 40 
per cent of this market niche85. 
 
These first two engines in the Trent family were followed by the less powerful Trent 
500 which was the sole powerplant for extended range versions of the Airbus A340. 
This was followed by the launch of a fourth engine, the Trent 900 in 2001, for the 
Airbus A380. For this application Rolls-Royce’s rivals were forced to combine their 
efforts by resorting to a joint venture called Engine Alliance, which developed the 
GP7200 engine, which combined the core of General Electric’s GE90 engine with the 
fan of Pratt and Whitney’s PW4000 engine. Finally in 2004 Rolls-Royce launched the 
latest Trent engine, the Trent 1000, which became the launch engine on Boeing’s 787 
‘Dreamliner’. 
 
Further steps towards implementing the full line strategy occurred through 
acquisitions that took place in the 1990s (table 7). The acquisition of the American 
engine firm Allison in 1995 added a small turbofan engine, the 10,000lbs thrust 
AE3007, to the company’s product portfolio just at the point when the market for 
small regional jets was taking off, while the acquisition of BMW’s share of the BMW 
Rolls-Royce joint venture in 1999 strengthened Rolls-Royce’s position in the market 
for large corporate jets. Taking stock of both acquisitions the Financial Times86 noted: 
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The acquisition of Allison in the US in 1995, and the joint venture 
development with BMW, the German car maker, of a new mid-sized jet 
engine range during the 1990s, has allowed it to carve out a significant, and 
rising share of the fast-growing market for regional and corporate jets. 
 
The significance of Rolls-Royce’s efforts at broadening its product portfolio can be 
seen in improvements in the company’s share of the worldwide civil aero engine 
market. In 1993, with the Trent still under development, Rolls-Royce’s market share 
stood at 21 per cent87 almost double what it had been a decade earlier. However it still 
trailed its two American rivals. Pratt and Whitney had seen its market share decline 
steadily from 60 per cent in the early 1980s to 30 per cent by 199288. General Electric 
had recorded an increase in market share over the course of the 1980s, helped in 
particular by the runaway success of its military-derived CFM56 engine, the product 
of its joint venture with France’s Snecma, and the sole powerplant for the Boeing 737 
the world’s best selling airliner. Such was the success of this joint venture that by 
1992 General Electric had eclipsed Pratt and Whitney as the market leader in the civil 
aero engine market.   
 
Table 7  
Acquisitions by Rolls-Royce 1989-1999 
Date Company Origin Activity Purchase 
Price 
1989 Northern Engineering 
Industries plc 
UK Industrial 
Power 
£306m 
1995 Allison Engine Company US Aero engines £320m 
1999 
 
BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH Germany Aero engines £289m 
1999 
 
Vickers plc UK Marine power £676m 
1999 Cooper Energy Services US Energy 
Services 
£152m 
 
Source: Rolls-Royce Annual Reports 
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A decade later in 2003, with three different Trent engines in service and gaining the 
full benefit of its earlier alliances and acquisitions, Rolls-Royce had a much broader 
product portfolio, comprising engines for more than 30 different aircraft 
applications89 and this was reflected in its overall market share which had consistently 
averaged 30 per cent over the previous three years90. While General Electric had 
retained its position as market leader, Pratt and Whitney’s market share had declined 
further over the course of the 1990s, resulting in the elevation of Rolls-Royce to the 
position of the world’s second largest manufacturer of civil aero engines. Furthermore 
Rolls-Royce had been particularly successful in the market for engines to power wide-
bodied airliners, the biggest and most profitable market segment, where it had secured 
a 50 per cent market share91, and was the only one of the Big Three engine 
manufacturers to have secured a stake in all the main applications to have appeared on 
the market since 1990 without recourse to a joint venture.  
 
 
DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY 
 
The final steps in Rolls-Royce’s path to defence diversification took place in the 
1990s. Three acquisitions, one in 1989 and two in 1999 (table 7) aimed to reduce 
Rolls-Royce’s dependence not just on defence but on aerospace in general. As the 
Financial Times92 noted at the time of the first of these acquisitions: 
 
The deal with NEI appears to be the first step in a long process of fundamental 
change that will turn the aero engine maker into a broader industrial company. 
 
 
 
The acquisitions formed part of a strategy designed both to reduce the company’s 
dependence on the highly cyclical aerospace market and provide additional 
applications for Rolls-Royce’s gas turbine technology, in the same way that its pursuit 
of a broader product portfolio through a full line strategy aimed to spread the cost of 
maintaining the company’s gas turbine technology base.  
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In the case of Northern Engineering Industries (NEI) it was hoped that the acquisition 
provided scope for offering complete power generation packages combining Rolls-
Royce’s gas turbine technology with NEI’s steam generation capability, especially in 
combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants that were expected to be more widely used 
following electricity market re-structuring both in the UK and the US and Asia. 
 
Despite early success, Rolls-Royce proved to be too small a player in a market 
dominated by international groups such as Siemens and Westinghouse. Consequently 
in July 1996 the company announced that it was to sell its large steam power 
engineering business. The Financial Times93 noted: 
 
Seven years after the event, the folly of Rolls-Royce’s acquisition of NEI, the 
power generating group, is plain. Initial hopes that there would be synergy 
between Rolls’ gas turbines, which are derived from aero engines, and NEI’s 
steam business proved a mirage. 
 
The Parsons steam power generating business was sold to Siemens in 1997 and the 
Reyrolle Switchgear business was sold to VA Tech of Austria the following year.  
 
Table 8  
Changes in the Composition of Rolls-Royce Turnover 
 
 1997 2005 
 £m % £m % 
Civil Aerospace 1,848 49.0 3,510 53.2
Military Aerospace 1,164 30.9 1,413 21.4
Marine 275 7.3 1,097 16.6
Energy 483 12.8 505 7.6
Other - - 78 1.2
Total 3,770 100.0 6,603 100.0
 
Source: Rolls-Royce. Annual Report 1997, London: Rolls-Royce plc. 1998; Rolls-
Royce. Annual Report 2005, London: Rolls-Royce plc. 2006. 
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Ten years after the acquisition of NEI, Rolls-Royce made by far its biggest acquisition 
with the purchase of Vickers for £636million. The attraction of Vickers was its marine 
propulsion business where it was a world leader in the manufacture of water jets 
which were increasingly being used instead of propellers. This was a field in which 
Rolls-Royce already had expertise having supplied gas turbine and nuclear 
powerplants to the navy for many years. Vickers had itself recently undergone 
extensive re-structuring having sold off its automotive interests and bought the 
Norwegian maritime equipment company Ulstein Holdings. The re-structuring meant 
that Vickers was now a major player in the maritime propulsion market. The Rolls-
Royce and Vickers maritime businesses complemented each other, enabling Rolls-
Royce to offer a wide range of competitive products, services and brands. As the 
company’s annual report94 noted: 
 
The acquisition of the Vickers marine business in 1999 and our continuing 
investment in our products are transforming the scope and scale of our marine 
business. 
 
The final acquisition was Rolls-Royce’s purchase of Cooper Energy Service from 
Cooper Cameron Inc of Ohio. This enhanced Rolls-Royce’s position in the market for 
gas turbines used for gas compression, oil pumping and power generation. The 
acquisition served to strengthen the company’s position in the oil and gas field 
complementing its existing work in the power generation. 
 
The overall effect of these acquisitions was to reduce Rolls-Royce’s defence 
dependency still further. Table 8 shows that whereas military aerospace comprised 
almost 31 per cent of turnover in 1997 with Marine and Energy contributing 20.1 per 
cent, by 2005 military aerospace had declined to 21.4 per cent while Marine and 
Energy work exceeded it as a proportion of turnover having risen to 24.2 per cent. 
Overall, military aerospace now comprised barely one fifth of total turnover, very 
different from the company’s one time dependence on military work. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
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By the start of the twenty-first century Rolls-Royce was a very different business to 
60 years earlier. Not only had the goal advocated in the 1940s by a young Denning 
Pearson, that the company should break into civil aviation95, been achieved, but Rolls-
Royce was now the world’s second largest aero engine manufacturer after General 
Electric, as well as being a long established member of the leading strategic group in 
the industry, and a diversified business to the point where the defence market 
constituted little more than a fifth of total turnover.  
 
Over the 60 year period four distinct competitive strategies can be identified. Each 
reflects a particular point in the evolution of the civil aero engine industry. Thus when 
gas turbine engines were in their infancy Rolls-Royce pursued a focus strategy 
designed to gain market entry, and so position Rolls-Royce within the civil aero 
engine market. This strategy involved a focus on a specific market segment, namely 
gas turbine engines to power short/medium range and commuter airliners. As a 
strategy it built in part at least on the company’s long standing expertise in 
supercharger technology. It proved successful not only in winning a substantial share 
of the developing gas turbine market, but in enabling Rolls-Royce to learn the civil 
aviation business and by the 1960s the company was part of a group of engine makers 
who made up the Big Three, the leading strategic group within the industry, whose 
other members included Pratt and Whitney and General Electric. 
 
However Rolls-Royce’s early success proved comparatively short-lived. Boeing’s 
success in dominating the market for civil jet airliners meant that by the late 1960s the 
US engine maker Pratt and Whitney dominated the civil aero engine market. Rolls-
Royce’s position, both as a civil engine manufacturer and a member of the Big Three 
strategic group was severely threatened. To defend its position, Rolls-Royce pursued 
its American strategy. This was an ambitious strategy designed to break into the 
market for US-built airliners, by achieving competitive advantage over Rolls-Royce’s 
American rivals through offering a sophisticated advanced technology engine, the 
RB211. In the short term it was to prove disasterous, leading to the collapse of the 
company and it being taken into public ownership. In the longer term the strategy did 
succeed in winning Rolls-Royce a share of the market for engines powering US-built 
airliners, thereby retaining its position in the Big Three strategic group. However 
market changes, in particular the success of wide-bodied twin-jet airliners like the 
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Airbus A300, eventually forced Rolls-Royce to question the wisdom of focussing 
almost exclusively on the US market. As a result in the 1980s Rolls-Royce changed 
direction and introduced a new strategy.  
 
Like earlier strategies, the purpose of this new full line strategy was to enable the 
company to influence its position in the market. Unlike its earlier American strategy 
the aim was offensive rather than defensive. It was an offensive strategy that aimed to 
increase the company’s market share by offering engines for the widest possible range 
of airframe applications, thereby strengthening the company’s position within the Big 
Three strategic group. Implemented through joint ventures in the 1980s and through 
the modular design of the Trent family of engines and acquisitions in the 1990s, it 
proved highly effective in broadening the product portfolio and led to significantly 
increased market share.    
 
Although not aimed directly at positioning the company within the aerospace 
industry, Rolls-Royce’s recent strategy of diversification too was concerned with 
positioning. By trying to reduce Rolls-Royce’s exposure to the highly cyclical nature 
of aerospace, this strategy aimed to position the company as a diversified industrial 
group similar to its rivals Pratt and Whitney and General Electric. 
 
Hence the strategies pursued by Rolls-Royce over the last 60 years have in common a 
concern for the company’s market position, in particular, a desire to strengthen the 
company’s structural position within the industry, in order to gain competitive 
advantage. This has generally meant Rolls-Royce being positioned as a member of the 
leading strategic group in the industry. This in turn reflects the importance of strategic 
groups in the aero engine industry, where firms in the Big Three group are sharply 
differentiated from firms in other strategic groups, such as the military engine 
manufacturers or the small engine manufacturers. This differentiation rests on their 
strategic assets and the basis upon which they compete, for the Big Three firms are 
the only engine manufacturers with the capability to design, develop, manufacture and 
support both military and civil engines.  
 
However as Grimm et al.96 note, ‘a firm’s positioning in an industry is only one half 
of the competitive puzzle’. The resource-based view of strategy, which traces its 
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origins to Penrose97, emphasises that a firm’s resources and the capabilities associated 
with them are crucial to competitive advantage. This has been a feature of Rolls-
Royce’s more recent strategies. In particular its full line strategy, aimed not just to 
position the company in a particular strategic group, it also aimed to enhance the 
company’s capability, especially its technological capability. With advanced 
technology an increasingly vital feature of competing in the largest and most 
profitable sector of the civil aero engine market, namely the sector for ultra high 
thrust engines to power the latest wide-bodied airliners, maintaining technological 
leadership is critical to gaining and maintaining competitive advantage in the aero 
engine industry. Technological leadership demands that an aero engine manufacturer 
maintains an advanced technology base, with resources capable of generating a stream 
of new technologies that can be incorporated into new engines to deliver improved 
performance. To do this requires a company to maximise applications for the 
technology so that the high cost of maintaining an advanced technology base can be 
spread across a large number of products. Rolls-Royce’s full line strategy, and for that 
matter its diversification strategy, stands as an example of this type of ‘resource-
based’ strategy98. Its 30 per cent share of the civil aero engine market worldwide in 
2003 combined with its 50 per cent share of the market for engine to power wide-
bodied airliners, indicates Rolls-Royce’s success in pursuing this type of strategy99. 
 
Resource-based strategy also provides an explanation of why Rolls-Royce has not 
resorted to defence dependency. To have forsaken the civil aviation market would 
have meant conceding technological leadership in the industry, something that apart 
perhaps for a brief period in the mid-1980s, Rolls-Royce has always been unwilling to 
countenance. 
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